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&BECAUSE FPGAS CAN provide a useful balance
between performance, rapid time to market, and
flexibility, they have become the primary source of
computation in many critical embedded systems.1,2
The aerospace industry, for example, relies on FPGAs
to control everything from the Joint Strike Fighter to
the Mars Rover. Face recognition systems, wireless
networks, intrusion detection systems, and supercom-
puters, all of which are employed in large security
applications, also use FPGAs. In fact, in 2005 alone, an
estimated 80,000 different commercial FPGA design
projects began.3
Because major IC manufacturers outsource most of
their operations,4 IP theft from a foundry is a serious
concern. FPGAs provide a viable solution to this
problem because the sensitive IP is not loaded onto
the device until after it has been manufactured and
delivered, making it harder for adversaries to target a
specific application or user. Furthermore, modern
FPGAs use bitstream encryption and other methods to
protect IP once it is loaded onto the FPGA or an
external memory.
However, techniques beyond bitstream encryption
are necessary to ensure FPGA design security. To save
time and money, FPGA systems are typically cobbled
together from a collection of existing
computational cores, often obtained
from third parties. These cores can be
subverted during the design phase, by
tampering with the tools used to
translate the design to the cores or by
tampering with the cores themselves.
Building every core and tool from
scratch is not economically feasible in most cases,
and subversion can affect both third-party cores and
cores developed in-house. Therefore, embedded
designers need methods for securely composing
systems comprising both trusted and untrusted com-
ponents.
Reconfigurable systems
Several examples of FPGA applications can help
illustrate the utility of FPGAs, along with the need for
increased security. We choose encryption, avionics,
and computer vision examples because these appli-
cations demand high throughput and strong security.
We also provide background on FPGA architecture
and design flows to review the nuts and bolts of this
useful technology.
Motivating examples
FPGAs are a natural platform for the implementa-
tion of cryptographic algorithms, given the large
number of bit-level operations required in modern
block ciphers. Because transformations also require
shifting or permuting bits, these operations can be
wired into the FPGA, thus incurring extremely low
overhead, and with parallelism where appropriate.
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FPGAs combine the programmability of processors with the performance of
custom hardware. As they become more common in critical embedded
systems, new techniques are necessary to manage security in FPGA designs.
This article discusses FPGA security problems and current research on
reconfigurable devices and security, and presents security primitives and a
component architecture for building highly secure systems on FPGAs.
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FPGA-based implementations of MD5, SHA-2, and
various other cryptographic functions have exploited
this sort of bit-level operation. Even public-key
cryptographic systems have been built atop FPGAs.
Similarly, there are various FPGA-based intrusion-
detection systems (IDS).
All this work centers around exploiting FPGAs to
speed cryptographic or intrusion-detection primitives,
but it is not concerned with protecting the FPGAs
themselves. Researchers are just now starting to realize
the security ramifications of building such systems
around FPGAs.
Cryptographic systems such as encryption devices
require strong isolation to segregate plaintext (red)
from ciphertext (black). Typically, red and black
networks (as well as related storage and I/O media)
are attached to the device responsible for encrypting
and decrypting data and enforcing the security policy;
this policy ensures that unencrypted information is
unavailable to the black network.
In more concrete terms, Figure 1 shows an
embedded system with its components divided into
two domains, which we have illustrated with different
shading. One domain consists of MicroBlaze0 (a
processor), an RS-232 interface, and a distinct memory
partition. The other domain consists of MicroBlaze1,
an Ethernet interface, and another distinct partition of
memory. Both domains share an AES (Advanced
Encryption Standard) encryption core, and all the
components are connected over the on-chip periph-
eral bus (OPB), which contains policy enforcement
logic to prevent unintended information flows be-
tween domains. An authentication function to inter-
pret data from a biometric iris scanner (which might
be attached to the RS-232 port) could be added to
such a layout. However, if the authentication required
a high degree of trustworthiness, the implementation
of the function would need to reside in a (new or
existing) trusted core.
In the aviation field, both military and commercial
sectors rely on commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) FPGA
components to save time and money. In military
aircraft, sensitive targeting data is processed on the
same device as less-sensitive maintenance data. Also,
certain processing components are dedicated to
different levels of data in some military hardware
systems. Because airplane designs must minimize
weight, it is impractical to have a separate device for
every function or level. Allocation of functions to
provide separation of logical modules is a common
practice in avionics to resolve this problem and to
provide fault tolerance—for example, if a bullet
destroys one component.
Lastly, intelligent video surveillance systems can
identify potentially suspicious human behavior and
bring it to the attention of a human operator, who can
make a judgment about how to respond. Such systems
rely on a network of video cameras and embedded
processors that can encrypt or analyze video in real
time using computer vision technology, such as
human behavior analysis and face recognition. FPGAs
are a natural choice for any streaming application
because they can provide deep computation pipe-
lines, with no shortage of parallelism. Implementing
such a systemwould require at least three cores on the
FPGA: a video interface for decoding the video stream,
an encryption or computer vision mechanism for
processing the video, and a network interface for
sending data to a security guard’s station. Each of
these modules must be isolated to prevent sensitive
information from being shared between modules
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Figure 1. A system consisting of two processors, a shared AES
(Advanced Encryption Standard) encryption core, an Ethernet
interface, an RS-232 interface, and shared external DRAM
(dynamic RAM), all connected over a shared bus. (DDR: double
data rate; SDRAM: synchronous DRAM.) (Revised from T.
Huffmire et al., ‘‘Designing Secure Systems on Reconfigurable
Hardware,’’ ACM Trans. Design Automation of Electronic
Systems (TODAES), vol. 13, no. 3, July 2008, article 44. G 2008
ACM with permission.5)
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improperly—for example, directly between the video
interface and the network.
FPGA architecture
FPGAs use programmability and an array of
uniform logic blocks to create a flexible computing
fabric that can lower design costs, reduce system
complexity, and decrease time to market, using
parallelism and hardware acceleration to achieve
performance gains. The growing popularity of FPGAs
has forced practitioners to begin integrating security as
a first-order design consideration, but the resource-
constrained nature of embedded systems makes it
challenging to provide a high level of security.
An FPGA is a collection of programmable gates
embedded in a flexible interconnect network that can
contain several hard or soft microprocessors. FPGAs
use truth tables or lookup tables (LUTs) to implement
logic gates, flip-flops for timing and registers, switch-
able interconnects to route logic signals between
different units, and I/O blocks for transferring data into
and out of the device. A circuit can be mapped to an
FPGA by loading the LUTs and switch boxes with a
configuration, a method that is analogous to the way a
traditional circuit might be mapped to a set of AND
and OR gates.
An FPGA is programmed using a bitstream. This
binary data, loaded into the FPGA through specific I/O
ports on the device, defines how the internal resources
are used for performing logic operations. (For a
detailed discussion of the architecture of a modern
FPGA, see the survey by Compton and Hauck.1)
Design flow
Figure 2 shows some of the many different design
flows used to compose a single modern embedded
system. The FPGA implementation relies on several
sophisticated software tools created by many different
people and organizations. Special-purpose processing
cores, such as an AES core, can be distributed in the
form of the hardware description language (HDL),
netlists (which are a list of logical gates and their
interconnections), or a bitstream. These cores can be
designed by hand, or they can be automatically
generated by design tools. For example, the Xilinx
Embedded Development Kit (EDK) generates a soft
microprocessor on which C code can be executed.
There are even tools that convert C code to HDL,
including Mentor Graphics Catapult C and Celoxica.
An example of an especially complex design flow is
AccelDSP, which first translates Matlab algorithms into
HDL; logic synthesis then translates this HDL into a
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Figure 2. A modern FPGA-based embedded system in which distinct cores with different pedigrees and varied trust
requirements occupy the same silicon. Reconfigurable logic, hardwired soft-processor cores, SRAM (static RAM)
blocks, and other soft IP cores all share the FPGA and the same off-chip memory. (BRAM: block RAM; DSP: digital-
signal processing; HDL: hardware description language; mP: microprocessor.)
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netlist. Next, a synthesis tool uses a place-and-route
algorithm to convert this netlist into a bitstream, with
the final result being an implementation of a
specialized signal-processing core. Security vulnerabil-
ities can be introduced into the life cycle inadvertently
because designers sometimes leave ‘‘hooks’’ (features
included to simplify later changes or additions) in the
finished design. In addition, the life cycle can be
subverted when engineers inject unintended function-
ality, some of which might be malicious, into both
tools and cores.
Reconfigurable security problems
Design-tool subversion, composition, trusted found-
ries, and bitstream protection are problems often
associated with reconfigurable hardware.
Design-tool subversion
The subversion of design tools could easily result in
a malicious design being loaded onto a device. For
example, a malicious design could physically destroy
the FPGA by causing the device to short circuit. In fact,
major design-tool developers have few or no checks in
place to ensure that attacks on specific functionality
are not included. However, we are not proposing a
method that makes possible the use of subverted
design tools to create a trusted core. Rather, our
methods make it possible to safely combine trusted
cores, developed with trusted tools (perhaps using in-
house tools that might not be fully optimized) with
untrusted cores. FPGA manufacturers such as Xilinx
provide signed cores that embedded designers can
trust. Freely available cores obtained from sources
such as OpenCores might have vulnerabilities intro-
duced after distribution from the original source.
However, a digital signature does not prevent a
vulnerability either.
The composition problem
Given that different design tools produce a set of
interoperating cores, and in the absence of an
overarching security architecture, you can only trust
your final system as much as you trust your least-
trusted design path.6 If there is security-critical
functionality (such as a unit that protects and operates
on secret keys), there is no way to verify that other
cores cannot snoop on it or tamper with it.
One major problem is that it’s now possible to copy
hardware, not just software, from existing products,
and industry has invested heavily in mechanisms to
protect IP. Few researchers have begun to consider the
security ramifications of compromised hardware.
Industry needs a holistic approach to manage
security in FPGA-based embedded-systems design.
Systems can be composed at the device, board, and
network levels. At the device level, one or more IP
cores reside on a single chip. At the board level, one or
more chips reside on a board. At the network level,
multiple boards are connected over a network. These
multiple scales of design present different potential
avenues for attack. Attacks at the device level can
involve malicious software as well as sophisticated
sand-and-scan techniques. Attacks at the board level
can involve passive snooping on the wires that
connect chips and the networks that connect boards
as well as active modification of data traffic. There are
security advantages to using a separate chip for each
core, because doing so eliminates the threat of cores
on the same device interfering with one another. This
advantage must be weighed against the increased
power and area cost of having more chips and the
increased risk of snooping on the communication
lines between chips.
Composing secure systems using COTS compo-
nents also presents difficulties:
& Did the manufacturer insert unintended func-
tionality into the FPGA fabric? Was the device
tampered with en route from the factory to the
consumer?
& Does one of the cores in the design have a flaw
(intentional or otherwise) that an attacker could
exploit? Have the design tools been tampered
with?
& Does a security flaw exist in the software running
on general-purpose CPU cores or in the compiler
used to build the software?
& If an embedded device depends on other parts
of a larger network (wired or wireless) of other
devices (a system of systems), are those parts
malicious?
We propose a holistic approach to secure system
composition on an FPGA that employs many different
techniques, both static and runtime, including life-
cycle management, reconfigurable mechanisms, spa-
tial isolation, and a coherent security architecture. A
successful security architecture must help designers
manage system complexity without requiring all
system developers to have complete knowledge of
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the inner workings of all hardware and software
components, which are far too complex for complete
analysis. An architecture that enables the use of both
evaluated and unevaluated components would let us
build systems without having to reassess all the
elements for every new composition.
The trusted-foundry problem
FPGAs provide an important security benefit over
ASICs. When an ASIC is manufactured, the sensitive
design is transformed from a software description to a
hardware realization, so the description is exposed to
the risk of IP theft. For sensitive military content, this
could create a national security threat. Trimberger
explains how FPGAs address the problem for the
fabrication phase, but the security problem of
preventing the design from being stolen from the
FPGA itself remains and is similar to that of an ASIC.7
Bitstream protection
Most prior work relating to FPGA security focuses
on preventing IP theft and securely uploading bit-
streams in the field. Because such theft directly
impacts the ‘‘bottom line,’’ industry has already
developed several techniques to combat FPGA IP
theft, such as encryption, fingerprinting, and water-
marking. However, establishing a root of trust on a
fielded device is challenging because it requires
incorporating a decryption key into the finished
product. Some FPGAs can be remotely updated in
the field, and industry has devised secure hardware
update channels that use authentication mechanisms
to prevent a subverted bitstream from being uploaded.
These techniques were developed to prevent an
attacker from uploading a malicious design that
causes unintended functionality. (Trimberger provides
a more extensive overview of bitstream protection
schemes.7)
Reconfigurable security solutions
Solutions to reconfigurable security problems fall
into two categories: life-cycle management and a
secure architecture.
Life-cycle management
Clearly, industry needs an approach to ensure the
trustworthiness of all the tools involved in the complex
FPGA design flow. Industry already deals with this life-
cycle management problem with software configura-
tion management, which covers operating systems,
security kernels, applications, and compilers. Config-
uration management stores software in a repository
and assigns it a version number. The reputation of a
tool’s specific version is based on how extensively it
has been evaluated and tested, the extent of its
adoption by practitioners, and whether it has a history
of generating output with a security flaw. The rationale
behind taking a snapshot in time of a particular
version of a tool is that later versions of the tool might
be flawed. For example, because automatic updates
can introduce system flaws, it is often more secure to
delay upgrades until the new version has been
thoroughly tested.
A similar strategy is needed for life-cycle protection
of hardware to provide accountability in the develop-
ment process, including control of the development
environment and tools, as well as trusted delivery of
the chips from the factory. Both cores and tools should
be placed under a configuration management system.
Ideally, it should be possible to verify that the output of
each stage of the design flow faithfully implements the
input to that stage through the use of formal methods
such as model checking. However, such static analysis
suffers from the problem of false positives, and a
complete security analysis of a complex tool chain is
not possible with current technology, owing to the
exponential explosion in the number of states that
must be checked.
An alternative is to build a custom set of trusted
tools for security-critical hardware. This tool chain
would implement a subset of the commercial tool
chain’s optimization functions, and the resulting
designs would likely sacrifice some measure of
performance for additional security. Existing research
on trusted compilers could be exploited to minimize
the development effort. A critical function of life-cycle
protection is to ensure that the output (and transitively
the input) does not contain malicious artifacts.8
Testing can also help ensure fidelity to requirements
and common failure modes. For example, it should
consider the location of the system’s entry points, its
dependencies, and its behavior during failure.
Life-cycle management also includes delivery and
maintenance. Trusted delivery ensures that the FPGA
has not been tampered with from manufacturing to
customer delivery. For an FPGA, maintenance in-
cludes updates to the configuration, which can occur
remotely on some FPGAs. For example, a vendor
might release an improved version of the bitstream
that fixes bugs in the earlier version.
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Secure architecture
Programmability of FPGAs is a major advantage for
providing on-chip security, but this malleability
introduces unique vulnerabilities. Industry is reluctant
to add security features to ASICs, because the edit-
compile-run cycle cost can be prohibitive. FPGAs, on
the other hand, provide the opportunity to incorporate
self-protective security mechanisms at a far lower cost.
Memory protection. One example of a runtime
security mechanismwe can build into reconfigurable
hardware is memory protection. On most embedded
devices, memory is flat and unprotected. A reference
monitor, a well-understood concept from computer
security, can enforce a policy that specifies the legal
sharing of memory (and other computing resources)
among cores on a chip.9 A reference monitor is an
access control mechanism that possesses three
properties: it is self protecting, its enforcement
mechanisms cannot be bypassed, and it can be
subjected to analysis that ensures its correctness and
completeness.10 Reference monitors are useful in
composing systems because they are small and do
not require any knowledge of a core’s inner
workings.
Spatial isolation. Although synthesis tools can
generate designs in which the cores are intertwined,
increasing the possibility of interference, FPGAs
provide a powerful means of isolation. Because
applications are mapped spatially to the device, we
can isolate computation resources such as cores in
space by controlling the layout function,11 as Figure 3
shows. A side benefit of the use of physical isolation of
components is that it more cleanly modularizes the
system. Checks for the design’s correctness are easier
because all parts of the chip that are not relevant to the
component under test can be masked.
McLean and Moore provide similar concurrent
work.12 Although they do not provide extensive details,
they appear to be using a similar technique to isolate
regions of the chip by placing a buffer between them,
which they call a fence.
Tags. As opposed to explicitly monitoring attempts to
access memory, the ability to track information and its
transformation as it flows through a system is a useful
primitive for composing secure systems. A tag is
metadata that can be attached to individual pieces of
system data. Tags can be used as security labels, and,
thanks to their flexibility, they can tag data in an FPGA
at different granularities.
For example, a tag can be associated with an
individual bit, byte, word, or larger data chunk. Once
this data is tagged, static analysis can be used to test
that tags are tightly bound to data and are immutable
within a given program. Although techniques currently
exist to enhance general-purpose processors with tags
such that only the most privileged software level can
add or change a tag, automaticmethods of adding tags
to other types of cores are needed for tags to be useful
as a runtime protectionmechanism. Early experiments
in tagged architectures should be carefully assessed to
avoid previous pitfalls.13
Secure communication. To get work done, cores
must communicate with one another and therefore
cannot be completely isolated. Current cores can
communicate via either shared memory, direct
connections, or a shared bus. (RF communication
might be possible in the future.) For communication
via sharedmemory, the referencemonitor can enforce
the security policy as a function of its ability to control
access to memory in general. For communication
via direct connections, static analysis can verify that
only specified direct connections are permitted, as
we discussed earlier. Such interconnect-tracing
595
Figure 3. Sample layout for a design with four
cores and a moat size of two. There are several
different drawbridge configurations between the
cores. (IOB: I/O block; CLB: configuration
logic block.)
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techniques can be applied at both the device and
board levels.
Communication via a shared bus must address
several threats. If traffic sent over the bus is encrypted,
snooping is not a problem. To address covert channels
resulting from bus contention, every core can be given
a fixed slice of time to use the bus. Although various
optimizations have been proposed, this type of
multiplexing is clearly inefficient, because a core’s
needs can change over time.
Future work
Embedded devices perform a critical role in both
the commercial and military sectors. Increasingly
more functionality is being packed onto a single
device to realize the cost savings of increased
integration, yet researchers have yet to address on-
chip security. FPGAs can have multiple cores on the
same device operating at different trust levels. Because
FPGAs are at the heart of many embedded devices,
new efficient security primitives are needed. We see
opportunities for future work in multicore systems,
further integration of our security primitives, reconfi-
gurable updates, and both covert and side channels.
Multicore systems
As computing changes from a general-purpose
uniprocessor model with disk and virtual memory to a
model in which embedded devices such as cell
phones perform more computing tasks, a new
approach to system development is needed. Most
future systems will likely be chip multiprocessor
systems running multiple threads, SoCs with multiple
special-purpose cores on a single ASIC, or a compro-
mise between those two extremes on an FPGA. When
the number of cores becomes large, communication
between the cores over a single shared bus is
impractical, and the use of direct connections (such
as grid or mesh communication) becomes necessary.
New techniques are necessary to mediate secure,
efficient communication of multiple cores on a single
chip. System design under this new model will require
changes to the way in which implementations are
developed to ensure performance, correctness, and
security.
Further integration of security primitives
Our recent work has shown that by physically
locating computations in different chip regions, and
by validating the hardware boundaries between these
regions, an efficient new mechanism for ensuring
isolation is possible.11 However, if a computing
resource, such as an encryption unit, must be shared
among security domains, then a temporal scheme
(possibly based on data tagging) might be required.
We are pursuing development of formal and practical
methods that cooperatively apply spatial schemes,
temporal schemes, and tagging to a design in a way
that meets security requirements and minimizes
overhead.
Reconfigurable updates
Many modern FPGAs can dynamically change part
of their configuration at runtime. Partial reconfigura-
tion makes it possible to update the circuitry in a
fielded device to patch errors in the design, provide a
more efficient version, change algorithm parameters,
or add new data sets (such as Snort IDS rules). The
avionics industry, for example, would like the ability to
update systems in flight as a fault tolerance measure.
Also, some supercomputers have partially reconfigur-
able coprocessors.
A dynamic system is more complicated and
difficult to build than a static one, and this is true of
the security of such a system as well. In many cases,
secure state must be preserved across updates. A hot-
swappable system is especially challenging because
state must be transferred from the executing core to
the updated core. In addition, data from the executing
core must be mapped to the updated core, which
might need to store the same data in a completely
different location as the previous version.
In fact, the practical difficulties of implementing
systems that employ partial reconfiguration has
prevented its widespread use. The costs of dealing
with these complexities are rarely worth the savings in
on-chip area, which doubles every year anyway.
However, practitioners should understand the security
implications of partial reconfiguration as it applies to
dynamic updates. For example, an updated core
might have different security properties than the
previous core. We are investigating the requirements
for partial reconfiguration within our security archi-
tecture.
Channels and information leakage
Even if cores are spatially isolated, they might still
be able to communicate through a covert channel. In
a covert-channel attack, a high core leads classified
data to a low core that is not authorized to access
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classified data directly. The high source is also
constrained by rules that prevent it from writing
directly to the low destination. A covert channel is
typically exploited by encoding data into a shared
resource’s visible state, such as disk usage, error
conditions, or processor activity. Classical covert-
channel analysis involves enumerating all shared
resources and metadata on chip, identifying the
shared points, determining if the shared resource is
exploitable, determining the bandwidth of the covert
channel, and determining whether remedial action
can be taken.
A side channel is slightly different from a covert
channel in that the recipient is an entity outside the
system that observes benign processing and can infer
secrets from those observations. An example of a side-
channel attack is the power-analysis attack, in which
the power consumption of a cryptocore is externally
observed to extract the cryptographic keys. Finally,
there are overt illegal channels (such as direct
channels or trap doors). An example of a direct
channel is a system that lacks memory protection. A
core can transmit data to another core simply by
copying it into a memory buffer.
Clearly, new techniques are necessary to address
the problem of covert, side, and direct channels in
embedded systems. In theory, a design could be
statically analyzed to detect the presence of possible
unintended information flows, although the scalability
of this approach runs into computability limits. We are
continuing to investigate solutions to this problem.
WE HAVE DESCRIBED a security architecture and a set
of static and runtime primitives that work together to
separate cores so that they do not interfere with one
another, but this is only part of the picture. A
successful approach must combine life-cycle manage-
ment and a coherent security architecture for policy
enforcement. The security architecture we describe
here uses a set of primitives that complement one
another, including a reference monitor for memory
protection and a separation strategy that uses spatial
isolation and interconnect tracing.
Designing any trustworthy complex system is
challenging, and given the relative immaturity of
current FPGA design approaches in which multiple
computational cores from different sources are
combined using commercial tools, the current state
of embedded-systems security leaves much to be
desired. Industry and its customers can no longer take
hardware security for granted. Clearly, embedded-
design practitioners must become acquainted with
these problems and with related new developments
from the computer security research field, such as the
security primitives we’ve described here. Practitioners
must also adapt the rich body of life-cycle manage-
ment tools and techniques that have been created for
trustworthy software development and apply them to
hardware design. A path toward ensuring the security
of the tools and the resulting product is necessary to
provide accountability throughout the development
process. The holistic approach to system design we’ve
described here is a significant step in that direction.&
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